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Abstract
Profit sharing has been proposed as a solution to underemployment
resulting from collective bargaining, but the empirical results are
ambiguous and the theoretical basis for this claim is weak. This paper
shows equity sharing can, in theory, solve the principle shortcomings of
profit sharing. First, equity sharing can resolve both underemployment and
over employment. Second, the results do not depend on assuming thal
insiders and the firm are prevented from bargaining over employment
level. Third the system does not require government intervention since
both sides can beneht from adopting equity sharing.
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l.Introduction
Weitzman (see e.g. [7]) argued within an insider-outsider framework that profit sharing
can resolve the underemployment problem. Wtren a firm offers a profit-sharing package,
workers each gain additional income from their fraction ofthe profit share. In a bargaining
model this additional income will not come free, but rather displace wage income. Since
profit sharing lowers the wage, and since increasing the number of workers does not
increase the total profit share paid to workers, proht sharing lowers the firm's marginal
cost of employing workers, inducing higher employment. The Weitzman model has been
tested extensively on data from a number of countries. The results are mixed, with some
studies finding a positive relationship between profrt sharing and employment and others
finding no such relationship.
A basic problem with the profit sharing model is it assumes the firm unilaterally
determines the employment level. As Anderson and Deveretx (see e.g. []) show, if
ernployment is a bargaining paramet€r the bargained employment level is independent of
the profit share. Hence the assumption that employment is not bargained over is essential
to profit sharing efficacy. WeiEman justifies this assumption by arguing thal most union
contracls do not speciff employnent levels, a situation which is consistent with union
behavior in the Oswald insider-outsider model when the number of insiders is small.
Equity shming is an altemative mechanism for implementing Weitzman's idea regarding
profit sharing.
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This paper will reexamines the profit-sharing model and show that insiders, while
sometimes willing to cede the employment decision to the firm when there is no profit
sharing, will not normally do so with profit sharing making the assumption difficult tojustify. The paper also describes an equity sharing system under which insiders
individually ovrn equify in the company, 
€quify which does not giye insiders a conholling
interest. This distinguishes equity sharing from employee buyouts in which employees do
take control of the firm (Beu-Ner and B. Juq see e.g [2]).
2. The Prolit Sharing
Oswald (see e.g. [fl) proposed that the union utitity function differentiates between
"inside" and "outside" workers, with outside workers receiving no weight in the utility
firnctiofl. Assuming thsre are a total of Z-, inside workers with idmtical utility frrnctions
U(.), where U'(.)>0 and U"(.)<0, and designating employment of inside workers
by L, <i, and outside workers by Io ) 0 , the union utility function is
Uu =U(w)Li +U(w)(I, -I,) where w is the bargained wage and u, is the market wage.
Though the assumption that the union has no concern at all for outside workers might be
strong, this utilify function captures the essence ofthe insider-outsider division resulting
from the political nature of unions.
Adjusting the union utility function to incorporate a profit share s, and assuming the firm is
interested in maximizing profits net of the profit share, (1 
- 
s) fl = (l - s)(ft - wZ)
Where total employment is L=Li +Io and revenue is R=X(I), the feasible set in the
bargaining game is
S = l(U ",U f ) e nz I U " < IJ (w + (s I L) t7)) L, + U (w)(I, - t,1, U r < (l - s) lI).
Assuming that in disagreement inside workers eam the market wage il and the firm has
zero profits, the disagreement pornt ls I = (il,0) . With union bargaining power 7 the
weightedNash bargaining solution to this game (S, d) is the solution to
,tt r(r(,. ; n)r, + U (i)(T, - L) - u @)ri)',,,-,, r,', - p(1, -L) + oL, (t)
where firm revenue.R is assumedto satisff Ru <0, fir(0)> 0 and R(0)=0, and, p and
o are the non-negative Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the constraints Z, < i, and Lo20
respectively. The constraint Z, ) 0 is never binding and is omitted for simplicity.
Maximizing with respect to the wage gives
*=n 1-ru,@*ltD-u(') .L v (r-s)u'(u+;n) (2)
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which implies the income of employed workers in agreement, y = rry + * fI , is'L
,, R t-y u(Y)-U@)r=--: - (3)
- L y U'(Y)
Maximizing with respect to I,, substituting w from (Eq. 2), and noting ffrat if Li s|i
then Io = 0 since the rmion will always want an insider to be hired first and the firm is
indifferent, the first order condition is
U(Y)-U(Ia) U(r)-U(D,
' u'(v) N'g')
The first order condition maximizing with respect to Io is
(4)
(5)Rr. =Y-o u(Y)*u@)
N' @ f * rr - y){u (Y) * u (w))
and the complementary slackness conditions arc p(Lr-I,)=0 urd, oL, =0. From the
employment constaints tlree possibilities exist.
Case I : All insiders are employed (Li =I) and some outsiders are employed (Io > 0).
Case II : All insiders are employed (Li =I) and no outsiders are employed (Zo = 9;.
Case III : Some insiders are unemployed (Li <f,l u"a no outsiders are employed
(Zo = 0).
Fig. I depicts employment and income levels in the three cases fu given bargaining pow€r
I(y=:) when the revenue flmction is quadratic, the outside wage il is zero, and each
z
union member has a constant relative risk aversion utility frrnction with relative risk
. u"u\y I _
aversion 
- _,,''.i =. . This figure differs from most representations of the union-firmU'(Y) 2
bargaining problem which concenfate on the shape ofthe contact curve, usually under
the case III assumption of some insiders being unemployed. Rather than allowing
bargaining power to vary as is true along a contact curve, this figure assumes that
bargaining power is fixed and looks at the bargaining outcomes as a function of the
number of insiders. The line segment AB in Figure I represents the set of all possible
bargaining outcomes, a set composed of single points on each different contract curve
corresponding to oach different number ofinsiders.
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- 
U(Y)-U(w)
u'(y)
Note:
CaseI : ir.Ln?Li=Ln
Case Il : Ln 3L, A Lu + L, =7,,
Case III: L, , L, ) L, = L,
Fig. I Underemployment and Over employm€nt
In case I the number of insiders is less than L, and insiders agree to the hiring of
outsiders up to the point where the total number of worker is I,a . This is the point where
worker income I equals the marginal nevenue of labor from @q. 5). Since the extra
workers push income dovyn insiders would prefer not to allow this employnent of
outsidors, but the revenue gains are so large that fte firm can suacessfrrlly bargain for the
extra employment. Employment is still inefficiently low, as seen from the triangle a
representing welfare loss at employnent level Ir. Note that if insider bargaining power
7 is large then outside employment is small and this loss is large. If insiders have no
bargaining power (r/ = 0) then worker income is pushed down to the opportrmity cost of
labor and there is no efficiency loss.
Case II represents the intermediary situafion where the firm does not hire any outside
workers but does hire all the insiders. The employment level is lherefore {ixed at !,
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resulting in either underemployment or over employment depending on the number of
insiders. Since worker income is still given by @q. 3) and is above the marginal product of
labor, the firm would prefer to lower employment but is unable to do so in negotiations.
Case trI represents the opposite situation in which the number of insiders is so large and
the losses ofexcessive employment so high that the firm not only hires no outsiders but
refuses to hire all insiders. For any number of insiders greater than Ls only Z, of them
are hired. Still this rcpresents some over employn,ent as represented by the welfare loss of
triangle D. Since workers receive income from (Eq. 3) above the marginal product of labor,
the frm would prefer to lower employment. Risk averse workers are particularly anxious
to avoid unemployment thougb and can successfully bargain for some excess employment
of insiders as dekrmined by (Eq. 5). Comparable to the underemployment case, over
employment will be higher is insider bargaining power is higher, and the problem is
eliminated if insiders have no bargaining power.
Weitzman showed that if the wage but not employment were bargained over profit sharing
would increase employment by lowering the wage. This can be seen from (Eq. 2), which
implies 4 . O.If we ignore (Eq. 4) and (Eq. 5) and assume the firm can unilaterally hire'ds
workers, the lower wage will increase employment. This decrease can be excessive though.
From (Eq. 2) when,
- 
,l-yLU(Y\-U(Ds=r--_- (6)y 1t U'(Y)
the bargained wage falls to the market wage of 7, leading to efficient employment. But
for profit shares above this level the market wage is pushed below il and demand for
labor becomes excessive. Since worker income is still greater than Ir from @q. 3) for
!, . ,workers will accep employment at this wage and over employment results.L
3. The Equity Sharing Solution
As a solution to inefficient employment resulting from collective bargaining profit sharing
was shown to have several problems. This section considers equity sharing as an
altEmative system that differs from profit sharing in two essential ways: first individual
workers own equity stakes raJher than workers as a group claiming a profit share; second,
workers retain their equity stakes even if they leave the firm. Equity sharing can resolve
underemployment because of the first difference and can resolve over employment
because ofthe second difference.
When all insiders have identical equity stakes summing to a fraction e of outstanding
equity, the feasible set 
^Sof the bargaining game (^S, d; become
s = {(u',u r ) e nz Ftu. ut,. ["j n v, + u <, +(Ll nxr, - L,),(] r < (r - e) n] .
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Since firm profits are zero in disagreement the disagreement point remains unchanged at
d = (1r,0)
Note that tne I te.ro in the proirt sharing model has been changed to $ incorporate theLLi
first difference between equity sharing and profit sharing. The second difference is
reflected by unemployed insiders L, 
- 
L, also receiving an equity stake. The weighted
Nash bargaining problem is
,t%,,[r(,. tn)r,-r(r.en){Li-L)-u(ir+)'rt,-onr-, e)
- 
p1t, *7)+oL,
where the complementary slackness conditions are as before.
Proposition l. Equity sharing can eliminate the underemployment problem.
Proot Underemployment occurs under case I and under case II when RL(I) > u, . Case I:
Noting that Li =Ti and Io > 0, differentiating @q. 7) with respect to ,, and Zo gives
..._ 
R t-y Li U(Y)-U(w)
" L y T, *eL U'(Y) (8)
(e)Rr. =w-6 u(Y)-u(fr)
From @q. 8) when
n _ 
Li 
_t- r Zi Ug)-U(w)L v ll u'(Y)
rrt' <v > T * (l - 7[u (I) - u(w))
ttt' g T * (r - r)U V ) - u {w))
(r0)
the bargained wage is il, implying from (Eq. 9) and the complementary slackness
condition o.Lo=$ that the bargained employment level is such that workers are
employed up until the marginal revonue product of labor equals the opportunity cost of
labor.
Case II: Since I, = 4 fSq. 8) still applies. The first order condition with respect to Z,
when w= 7 is
Rr. =fr+P U(Y)-U(w) (ll)
By the non negativity of the Khun-Tucker multipliers (Eq. 9) and (Eq. I l) are both
satisfied only when RL(L.)=T , indicating case II occurs only when employment is
efficient.
Proposition 2. fuuity sharing can eliminate tlrc wer employment problem if the feasible
set is convex.
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Proot Over employment occurs under case III and under case II when n. (4) < ra . Case
Itr: Noting that L=I, since Lo=0, differentiating (Eq. 7) with respect to rry and then
setting u=7 gives
" L y L, 
-eL U'(Y)
indicating that
Li t-y L, ug1-u1o1
L v II u'(Yl
(12)
(13)
is consistent with rry=f. Since l=0 when L,.T,, equation (ll) implies Rt=fr
when r.r = il , indicating that the employment choice is efficient. Note that the given value
of e might also be consisknt with other stationary points with different values of w. Since
ru = il implies efhcient employment and equal distribution of income among inside
workers, this solution is pareto efficient. No other value of y, can be pareto efficient and a
solution ifthe feasible set is convex.
Case II: By the same argumcnt as ia Proposition 1, when the equity share is set such that
w =fr this case only occurs when -Rr. = w , indtcatrng efficient invesEnent.
In the above analysis the equity share is exogenous. An exogenously set share is necessary
in the profit sharing model, but not in the equity sharing model. Because inside workers
netd not share their dividends with outside workers, they canbenefit from efflcienry gains
induced by equity sharing.
Proposition 3. If insiders and the /irm bargain over the wage, employment, the equity
share, and the equity price, (i) employment is eficient and (ii) insiders are better offthan
without equity sharing.
Proot
(i) Assuming that insiders pay current stockowners directly for their shares and designating
the equity price by q, the feasible set becomes
s ={({t' ,ui)enz tuu. u(,.(fl(n-q))I,.r,r.[;- ),il-il)(T, -1,),ur
3 (l- e)ll+eq,t
and the disagreement point is unchanged. Rather than solving the bargaining game directly
with this feasible set consider the set
s'-{(u",ur)eE2luo <u{py)I,,ur <6-Byn*,7or o<p<r } whereLi
R* = .l?(Z+) and Z* is the efficient employment level. In tftis set the monetary surplus is at
its largest and each insider can attain an equal share ofthis surplus. ,S'therefore contains
all the points in S since if employment is inefftcient R < X*, and if the distribution of
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income among insiders is not equal U" <UW+)f,. Moreore. S also contains all the
Li
points in S'. Setting v=il and L: L* in set S, letting B=A|,*"1G1-'L*:D-R*
indicates that any distibution of flrm revonuc between the firm and insiders can be
attained by adjusting e and, q. Since S : S' the solution to the galne (,S, a) is the solution to
the game (S', d). This is simply
uw?>-utwt 
-
u,@f) R'; (14)p=;Ltr
or.lettins Y = SY-' Li'
,, R* t-y U(Y)-U(w)f =;_--_ (15)Li y U'(Y)
which is efficient.
(ii) When e : 0 and S : 0 tlre bargaining problem reduces to the profit sharing bargaining
problem when s : 0. From (Eq. 3) total insider income is
( n rtff\-trtur\) 
-| "-11-11 '-'' ' "'"" lL,+fr1L,-I,). This compares with total insider income(/. N',Vt )'
under equity sharing from (Eq. l5). If I, =i, , a occurs when there is initially
underemployment, then total income of insiders is higher with equity sharing since
,R*>,R and i, <L.If Li <Ii as occurs when there is initially over employment, then
total income of insiders is also higher with equity sharing since I > il and X* > n. In
each case since income is equally distributed among insiders higher total income implies
higher total utility for insiders.
A problem might arise ifthe bargaining is done in two stageq the first stage covering the
equity share and equity price and ttre second stage covering the wage and employment.
Since dividend income displaces wage income in the bargaining solution, insiders can
increase their income by selling the stock before the second stage. Anticipating this sell off"
the firm will not be willing to sell the stock at a discount in the first stage. This problem
can be prevented by locking workers in to their equity stake for a fixed period as occurs
with most employee stock ownership plans. Generally, the problem will be lessened when
capital market imperfections limit ths ability of workers to sell a large block of stock or
when workers have particular reasons for holding on to tlreir firm's stock.
It is worthwhile to briefly compare equity sharing with other mechanisms that have been
suggested to resolye underemployment and over employment. Regarding
underemploymenL one possibility is to use a two-tier wage structure in which new workers
are paid less than existing workers. Equity sharing mimics this result because inside
workers receive a higher income due to their equity holdings. Since all workers still
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receive the same wage the result may be more acceptable to insiders and to new workers.
It has also been proposed that unions incorporate and require any new members to buy a
share in the union. Sales of there shares would compensate existing members for the losses
of extra employmenl leading to an efficient outcome. Relale4 the workers can buy the
frm and require new workers to also buy stock in the firm (this would correspond to a
labor-managed firm with a membership fee. Such a fee can eliminate the problem of
underemployment in labor-managed firms, a problem which is closely related to that of
underemployment with unions. Note that equity sharing can achieve these same results in a
much simpler fashion. Only inside workers need to purchase stock and they need not
acquire all ofthe stock nor acquire control ofthe firm.
Regarding over employmen! cash paymeils to exiting workers is one solution. The
problem is that workers will still press to enter the furn if the wage is above the market
wage. This might explain why cash payments are often used for managerial staffbut rarely
for rmionized workers. Equity sharing works r$ an equivalent method that is self-enforcing.
Since the equity share pushes down the wage rate to the market wage, workers are willing
to leave the firm voluntarily. Although proflrt sharing also pushes down the wage rate,
workers will not lpave because they forfeit their proht share upon exit.
4. Conclusion
Equity shming success depends on one similarity with and two key differences from profit
sharing. The similarity is that in a bargaining model income from the equity share pushes
down the wage rate. The first difference is that each insider receives a portion of the firm's
profits, rather t}an workers as a whole receiving a share which is then divided The second
difference is that workers retain a right to their equity share evEn ifthey leave the company.
As a result insiders are more willing to allorr new workers to be hired when employment is
inefliciency low, and more willing to exit the firm when employment is ineffrciently high.
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